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Abstract 
This paper considers the issue of the right to life in several lethal force cases 
heard in the European Court of Human Rights as a result of State activity in 
response to terrorist and armed activity. In light of extensive judicial scrutiny, 
and the recent erroneous shooting dead ofBrazilian electrician,Jean Charles 
de Menezes on the London Underground by police, this paper submits that 
a military response may balance the dichotomy of terrorism and the right to 
life. Article 2, the right to life, is the most fundamental ofall the provisions of 
the European Convention on Human Rights; without it, all other provisions 
are redundant. However, this very right, in the context of lethal force and 
terrorism, was brought sharply into focus when Strasbourg heard the ground 
breaking Death on the Rock case, where terrorist suspects were shot dead 
by Special Forces soldiers in Gibraltar. Since this case, a number of lethal 
force cases have been heard by the European Court in relation to military 
and police terrorist operations. These cases have been subject to detailed 
scrutiny as to the application of the provisions of Article 2 of the Convention, 
and have produced divergent results. As a result, this paper submits that, 
in Europe at least, a military response acknowledges a State's authority to 
protect its populous and its agents, whilst at the same time entrenching the 
fundamental principle of the right to life, thus balancing two theoretically 
opposing concepts: the authority of the State and the right to life. 
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Introduction 
This paper considers the issue of the right to life in several lethal force 
cases heard in the European Conrt of Hnman Rights as a resnlt of State 
operations in response to armed and terrorist activity. 
I will submit that in light of extensive judicial scrutiny, and in light of 
the recent erroneous shooting dead of Brazilian electrician, Jean Charles 
de Menezes, on the London Underground by British police, that a military 
response may balance the dichotomy of terrorism and the right to life. 
Before delving into the fundamental issues of the paper, it is worthwhile 
just taking a moment to outline the key legislative provision that is the focus 
of this paper, and upon which the relevant case law takes its authority. 
Article 2, the right to life, is the most fundamental of all the provisions 
of the European Convention on Human Rights; it enshrines one of the most 
basic values of a democratic society.' Without it, all the other provisions are 
redundant.' Article 2 provides that: 
(1) Everyone's right to life shall be protected. No one shall be deprived 
of his life intentionally ... 
(2) Deprivation oflife shall not be regarded as inflicted in contravention 
of this Article when it results from the use of force which is no more 
than absolutely necessary: 
(a) in defence of any person from unlawful violence; 
(b) in order to effect arrest or to prevent the escape of a person 
lawfully detained; 
(c) in action lawfully taken for the purpose of quelling a riot or 
insurrection. 
Article 2 therefore affords lawful exceptions to the requirement of the 
right to life. 
Exceptions may only occur if the High Contracting Party can show that 
the force was 'no more than absolutely necessary'. This is a more stringent test 
than that required by Articles 8-11 of the Convention. Therefore, Article 2 
may be said to be a ban on unlawful killing by State agents. 3 
The obligation therefore is for the State to establish legal rules that prevent 
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the taking of life by any Stage agent, or indeed, any person. When a life is 
taken, the method of taking that life must fall within the categories outlined 
in Article 2.4 
So the text of Article 2 covers intentional killings and also situations 
where the use of force results in a death, which is an unintended outcome. Any 
use of force must be no more than absolutely necessary for the achievement 
of the purposes set out in Article 2. Therefore the use of force must be strictly 
proportionate to the achievement of the permitted aims. 5 
Consequently where there has been loss of!ife, those actions that brought 
about the loss oflife may be subject to scrutiny under Article 2.6 However, 
such scrutiny did not begin its real evolution until relatively recently. The case 
of McCann v United Kingdom, or the Death on the Rock case, was the catalyst 
that began the exponential evolution of the jurisprudence of European case 
law in relation to lethal force cases. 
1he case of McCann is of particular relevance to this paper for a number 
of reasons. Firstly it was the case that established a number of procedural 
obligations with which States must comply. Secondly, the principles that were 
established by the European Court in this case were the basis for the Court's 
scrutiny of all subsequent lethal force cases. Thirdly, it is a military lethal force 
case. As a result, this paper submits that although Strasbourg may consider 
the principles established in Mc Cann in each police and military lethal force 
case, the actual application of those principles differs depending on whether 
the Court is applying the principles to a police lethal force case, or a military 
lethal force case. 
The case of McCann arose when three IRA suspects were shot dead by 
SAS operatives in Gibraltar as a result of an anti-terrorist operation. This was 
the first time that the European Court had had the opportunity to scrutinise a 
lethal force case, because prior to McCann, all other cases being brought under 
Article 2 had either been screened out for failing to comply with procedural 
obligations, or had been decided by the Commission, as it existed at that 
time. 
1he effect of the Court's consideration of the obligations under the 
Convention in this seminal case was to secure a realistic and pragmatic 
prohibition of arbitrary killing by State agents.' This was achieved by 
authorising the Court to examine, inter alia, the planning and control of 
the operation that resulted in the lethal force, and creating an obligation 
to carry out an effective official investigation. Such duties and obligations 
protect the lives of all individuals, however, such protection comes with a 
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price. Toe Court in McCann noted that a terrorist attack presents the State 
with a huge challenge. On the one hand the State must have a regard to the 
protection of the lives ofits civilians and agents, and on the other, in light of 
the obligations flowing from the Convention and domestic law, it must have 
minimum resort to using lethal force against terrorist suspects. 8 Such an 
approach therefore enshrines the basic values of a democratic society,' that of 
ensuring that the Convention is an instrument to protect all individual human 
beings, regardless of beliefs or motives. Nonetheless, in order to achieve such 
protection, the safeguards must be practical and effective.10 
This paper will now examine the approach of the Court in relation to key 
themes arising from police and military lethal force cases, before returning to 
areas of concern arising from the Jean Charles de Menezes' shooting. 
Military Lethal Force 
Since the case of McCann, the Court of Strasbourg has not shied away 
from posing significant questions regarding the use of military force during 
law enforcement operations, especially in relation to countering terrorist 
and insurgency activities. There has been a sense of unease about the way 
in which the European Court has approached such military cases as there 
is a belief that such cases should be judged under the law of armed conflict, 
or international humanitarian law, as lex specialis. Instead, the European 
Court has, arguably, applied international human rights law to address such 
situations.11 It is not the purpose or remit of this paper to assess the issues of 
lex special is, but suffice to say that it is the author's opinion that human rights 
law has become lex specialis for the European Court in right to life cases 
arising out of armed conflicts." 
As noted, the case of McCann created a sea change in the jurisprudence 
of Strasbourg, and as such provided the framework from which the Court 
was authorised to review the planning and control of the operation, and the 
obligation on a State to carry out an effective investigation following the 
killing. The case of Ergi v Turkey13 followed on from McCann and not only 
recognised the principles established by its predecessor, 14 but also widened 
the application of the principles established in the Death on the Rock case. 
The case of Ergi concerned the shooting dead by Turkish military security 
forces of the applicant's sister during a planned armed ambush operation 
designed to capture members of the Kurdish Workers' Party (the PKK), 
a guerrilla organisation. The Government in the case of Ergi asserted that 
the Court's authority to examine a case of lethal force is limited only to 
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circumstances as described in McCann. In other words, where there is 
clear evidence that the death was as a result of the actions of State agents.15 
Strasbourg however swiftly rebutted such a presumption, commenting that 
the obligation to investigate a lethal force death was not confined to cases 
where it had been established that the killing had been caused by a State 
agent.16 Indeed, as the Court noted "mere knowledge of the killing on the part 
of the authorities" will actually trigger the obligation to carry out an effective 
investigation into the death, regardless of whether an official complaint has 
been lodged with the relevant authorities. 17 As a result of detailed scrutiny 
by the Court, the majority held that Turkey breached Article 2 on account of 
the planning and conduct of the security forces' operation, and in respect of 
its failure to carry out an adequate and effective investigation into the death 
of the applicant's sister. 18 What is also evidently clear from the judgment of 
the Court is that even though Strasbourg is eminently aware of the difficult 
security situation being presented by Turkey, where threats to its civilians 
and agents are without doubt an unpleasant reality, the Court recognises that 
the obligations under Article 2 entrench the fundamental ethos of the right 
to life. Thus "neither the prevalence of violent armed clashes nor the high 
incidence of fatalities" 19 can displace those obligations. As a result, a military 
response serves two purposes: firstly, a State may protect its national interests. 
Secondly, the obligations flowing from the Convention require that a State 
examine its procedures and conduct relation to terrorist operations so that 
individual rights are balanced against the seriousness of the circumstances.'° 
So the case of Ergi entrenched the principles set forth in the case of McCann, 
whilst reiterating "effective political democracy and the safeguarding of 
human rights."21 
More recently, the difficulties facing Russia and its turbulent relationship 
with Chechnya presented seemingly huge challenges for the European Court 
when the first cases from Russia were heard citing breaches of Article 2 in 
relation to military lethal force cases. Strasbourg had to apply those principles 
established inMcCann, and entrenched inErgi, to cases involving large-scale 
military operations in response to widespread insurgency activity. 
The conflict between Chechnya and Russia is rooted in centuries of 
history with calls to fight the Russian conquest being recorded in the 1700s. 
Since that time, peace between Russia and Chechnya has been tenuous. In 
1994, the Russian Federation failed to placate Chechnya when it demanded 
independence from Russia, and Moscow began the first Chechen war in an 
attempt to preserve constitutional order, although this war ended in 1996 
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after an agreement was signed to signify a ceasefire. Unfortunately the issue 
of independence was not settled and serious criminal activities flourished 
in Chechnya as its presidents failed to establish law and order. In 1999, the 
new Russian President, Putin, asserted his authority and ordered a massive 
military advance in Chechnya in an attempt to quash criminal armed groups 
and to undermine any beliefs of independence.22 Since the second war against 
Chechnya began, the hostilities have included serial aerial bombing over 
civilian routes and villages, enforced disappearances and the use ofinhumane 
weapons, including cluster bombs. Russia has continually denied any existence 
of an armed conflict, thus avoiding any breaches of the Geneva Convention, 23 
and instead refers to the events plaguing Russia and Chechnya as terrorism 
and banditry. 24 This reflects the approaches taken by the Turkish and British 
Governments, who have also denied the existence of an armed conflict in 
relation to the activities of the PKK and the IRA respectively, and instead 
characterised their operations as counter-terrorism, thus to be countered 
with law enforcement operations. As a result, international humanitarian 
law was inapplicable, hence the only route available to victims' families was 
that of international human rights law, under the European Convention on 
Human Rights." 
Certainly Europe has no issues with regard to its authority to scrutinise 
such armed conflicts, regardless of the name adopted by the State, on the 
proviso that such conflicts "occur within the territory of the State or areas 
under its effective control"" and certainly the conflict between Russia and 
Chechnya falls within that construct. Nonetheless, the challenge for the 
Court was whether the principles enunciated so clearly in the Death on the 
Rock case could be applied coherently, and without undermining the ethos 
of a State's sovereignty, in military cases on such a large scale. 
Although many Chechen cases have now come before Strasbourg as a 
result of loss of life and enforced disappearances during the conflict, this 
paper will concentrate on two of the the trilogy of cases whereby the Court 
delivered its first judgments concerning right to life violations in Chechnya. 
The cases ofisayeva, Yusupova and Bazayeva v Russia27 (Isayeva I) and Isayeva 
v Russia28 (Isayeva II) were delivered in February 2005. 
The case of Isayeva I arose out of a claim that the Russians had 
indiscriminately bombed a civil convoy evacuating the town of Grozny via 
a so-called "humanitarian corridor". During the evacuation, the Russian 
military set up a road block along the corridor and ordered the civilians 
to return to the town. As the convoy was undertaking the return, Russian 
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military planes carried out a bombing campaign on the convoy, resulting in 
many deaths and injuries of civilians. 29 
In the case of Isayeva II, a large number of Chechen rebels entered the 
village ofKatyr-Yurt, which was not expected by the villagers. Further, Katyr-
Yurt had been declared as a "safe zone" thus attracting refugees from other 
districts of Chechnya. A safe passage was offered to village residents during 
the military operation but it is believed that the rebels prevented many people 
from leaving. The Russian military launched an aerial attack on the village 
resulting in significant civilian deaths and injuries. 30 
In both cases, the Court took time to comment that the situation that 
existed in Chechnya at that time called for exceptional measures to be taken 
by the State in order to retain control and suppress insurgency activity. As 
such, those measures could include military operations and indeed may 
justify the use oflethal force. 31 Such acknowledgement by the Court affirms 
State sovereignty, which is, perhaps, not a surprising approach: the underlying 
concept of the Convention is that of nnity between High Contracting Parties, 
thus the Court must always have in its contemplation the voluntary nature 
of the obligations under the Convention. Howeve1; for such extraordinary 
measures to be taken by a State, there must be a balance between "the aim 
pursued and the means employed to achieve it". 32 
Relying on the principles established in McCann, the Court scrutinised 
both the planning and carrying out of the military operations, and also the 
obligation to carry out an effective investigation. 
In the case ofisayevaI, the Court was highly critical of the Government's 
contentions that the use of heavy combat weapons was a legitimate pursuit of 
its aims, that of quashing insurgency activity, as the Government's contentions 
were "contradicted by a substantial mass of other evidence presented to the 
Court."33 In light of this damning criticism, the Court found that Russia did 
not plan and execute its operation with the requisite care required and its 
response to the insurgency activity was disproportionate to the pursuit of 
its aims. 34 
In the case of Isayeva II, the Court was no less critical, noting that the use 
of such indiscriminate weapons "stands in flagrant contrast with [the] aim 
and cannot be considered compatible with the standard of care prerequisite 
to an operation of this kind involving the use oflethal force by State agents."35 
Indeed, the Court went further in its criticism, noting that it was impossible 
to reconcile the degree of caution required of a law enforcement body 
with the use of massive weaponry in a populated area without evacuating 
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civilians in peace time. 36 lt is of no surprise therefore that the Court found 
Russia in breach of Article 2 in relation to the planning and execution of the 
operation. 37 
The Court was no less scathing ofRussia's attempt to conduct an effective 
investigation in both cases. For an investigation to be effective, the authorities 
must act "of their own motion once the matter has come to their attention";" 
for the investigators to be independent; and for it to lead to the determination 
of whether the force was justifiable and to the identification and punishment 
of those responsible, although this is an obligation of means, not necessarily 
result.39 
Whilst the Court acknowledged that there may be circumstances that 
delay or make investigations difficult, a prompt and effective investigation 
is crucial in maintaining public confidence in the State's adherence to the 
rule of law and "preventing any appearance of collusion in or tolerance of 
unlawful acts."40 
What is interesting to note is that in the case of McCann, the Court did 
concede that the actual investigative procedure was flawed in places, but 
did not consider that the alleged shortcomings substantially hampered the 
carrying out of an effective investigation. Neither did the Court determine it 
necessary to instruct what form an investigation should take, and under what 
conditions it should be conducted.41 
However, the Court in the Chechen cases no longer felt so constrained 
by such limitations, and indeed felt compelled to comment on many aspects 
that rendered the investigations seriously flawed in many respects. In the case 
of Isayeva I, it was noted that the investigation did not take sufficient steps to 
identify victims and witnesses and that there were inordinate delays in the 
processes. Further, in an uncharacteristic fashion, Strasbourg even responded 
to the Government's assertion that the applicants undermined the investigation 
process by suggesting that the Government should have contemplated that 
the applicants would be feeling vulnerable, fearful and insecure thus would 
make their assistance in the investigation problematic.41 
The Court was equally critical of the investigation carried out in the 
case of Isayeva II and saw fit to comment on the flaws in the process and 
how the processes may have been improved to comply with the procedural 
requirements of the Convention. 43 
Such an approach reflects the determination of Strasbourg to ensure 
accountability and enforce human rights, even when a State is facing 
extraordinary territorial problems. I concur with the Court's determined 
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examination of the State's compliance with the two procedural obligations. 
Such robust scrutiny allows the Court to assess the legality ofa State's actions 
without necessarily interfering with a State's substantive responsibilities, 
therefore a High Contracting Party's voluntary status is respected whilst 
ensuring that human rights are safeguarded. It is not unreasonable therefore 
to assume that such rigorous scrutiny would be applied in the same manner to 
lethal force cases arising from police operations. This paper however submits 
that Strasbourg has a "tendency to find that the police have not failed in their 
Convention duties."44 It is to this matter that this paper now turns. 
Police Lethal Force 
In the case of Brady v United Kingdom, 45 James Brady was shot dead by 
police at a club in the north east of England. The police had been informed 
that Brady, along with others, was planning on carrying out an armed robbery 
at a club, although the police were also informed that the firearm that Brady 
would be carrying would be an imitation firearm. However, the police officers 
involved in the operation were told to treat all firearms as real, unless proven 
otherwise, and were informed that Brady had military training. 
The police discussed a number of options with regard to the planning and 
execution of the operation. These options were: 
An armed ambush at the club; or 
The introduction of a strong police presence in the club and the 
surrounding area before the operation; or 
Arresting the suspects at their homes before the armed robbery took 
place.46 
The second option was rejected because the Superintendant considered 
that although it would prevent the robbery that night, the suspects might 
return at a later date, and it would also be safer to remove potential threats 
as soon as possible. The third option was rejected because of the possibility 
that there would not be enough evidence to ensure a successful prosecution 
against the offenders. As a result, the police selected the first option as being 
the most appropriate in the circumstances. 
The complainant, Brady's father, argued that the first option brought 
about circumstances that endangered Brady's life that were unjustifiable. 
He submitted that those planning the operation failed to have regard to the 
inevitability of the use of lethal force as deploying armed officers at night 
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in a confined space to ambush armed suspects posed huge risks that the 
offenders would react defensively thus giving rise to a lethal force response by 
the police. Indeed, the complainant contended further that the police knew 
about the robbery four days in advance, yet the planning took place a mere 
six hours before the incident.47 
During its considerations, the Court was not persuaded that the police's 
plan to carry out an armed ambush "rendered the execution of the operation 
incompatible with the requirements of the Convention."48 Further, "if there 
had been insufficient evidence of a crime having been committed, there would 
have been no possibility ofbringing criminal charges or a prosecution.'"" 
At first sight, this approach suggests a pragmatic approach by the Court. 
However, this very approach is in direct contrast with that taken by the Court 
in the case ofMcCann. In the latter case, the British Government submitted 
that it would have been unreasonable to arrest the IRA suspects as: 
there might not have been sufficient evident to warrant the 
detention and trial of the suspects. Moreover to release them, 
having alerted them to the authorities' state of awareness 
but leaving them or others free to try again, would obviously 
increase the risks. Nor could the authorities be sure that 
those three were the only terrorists they had to deal with 
or of the manner in which it was proposed to carry out the 
bombing.50 
This argument echoes the submissions made by the police in the case of 
Brady, and yet the Court in McCann was quick to rebut the Government's 
submission, noting that not preventing the suspects' entry to Gibraltar "must 
be considered to outweigh the possible consequences of having insufficient 
evidence to warrant their detention and trial. .. [ a]s a result, the scene was set in 
which the fatal shooting ... was a foreseeable possibility if not a likelihood.''51 
I am unable to distinguish between the pleadings of the two cases, except 
perhaps for the seriousness of the situation. In the case of McCann, Gibraltar 
was at serious risk ofbeing subject to a terrorist attack, either at that moment, 
or in the near future. In the case of Brady, the armed robbery was to be carried 
out at night, away from the general public and with likely imitation firearms. 
I would argue therefore that it would have been even more important for the 
Government in the McCann case to have ensured that enough evidence was 
available to bring a secure conviction to protect the general public. 52 
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The Court however was convinced that not arresting Brady was merely 
a reflection of the flexibility required of such operations that are subject to 
evolving circumstances, 53 and yet in Mc Cann, not arresting the suspects prior 
to the operation was far from being construed as being part of flexible and 
evolving circumstances, and instead was condemned "as being surmountable 
to a poorly organised and executed operation."54 
Such dramatic discrepancies in the approaches taken by the Court cannot 
easily be rationalised, and as such create a certain sense of unease about the 
way in which Strasbourg approaches military and police lethal force cases. 
Nonetheless, such discrepancies also suggest that military responses to 
possible terrorist activities may ensure that the right to life is more vigorously 
assessed. 
The recent case of Giuliani and Gaggio v Italy" provides further evidence 
of such an approach. This case arose as a result of the death of Carlo Giuliani, 
a demonstrator, when he was shot dead by a member of the carabinieri56 
during violent demonstrations at the G8 Summit in 2001. The Italian 
Government submitted that that there was no cansal link between the shot 
fired by the carabinieri and the actual death of Giuliani, as the bullet only 
struck the demonstrator as a result of "highly unusual and unforeseeable 
circumstances.''57 The carabinieri, having been injured in the demonstrations, 
was ordered to take refuge in a Landrover Defender jeep, which was then 
surrounded and attacked by demonstrators. The carabinieri fired two shots 
with his pistol, and one bullet hit Giuliani in the face, causing the fatal injury; 
it was not possible to determine the exact trajectory of that bullet but it is 
likely that it ricocheted off a stone that had been thrown by an unknown 
demonstrator. 58 
In its assessment the Court acknowledged that the individual who 
fired the shot did so in a state of panic and in belief that his life was in real 
and imminent danger, which falls within the scope of Article 2, 59 and also 
reflects the considerations of the Court in the case of Brady. Here too the 
officer believed his life to be in imminent danger when he thought that Brady 
was pointing a gun at him; this turned out to be erroneous although the 
Court noted explicitly that "[e]rrors of judgment or mistaken assessments, 
unfortunate in retrospect, will not per se entail responsibility under Article 
2 of the Convention."60 Such unforeseeable and unfortunate circumstances 
leading to the death of Giuliani in the Italian case did not lead the Court to 
believe that the substantive aspect of Article 2 of the Convention had been 
breached in that respect. This is entirely in line with the approach taken by the 
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Court inMcCann also because "the use offorce ... where it is based on an honest 
belief which is perceived ... to be valid at the time but subsequently turns out 
to be mistaken"61 is entirely reasonable as "to hold otherwise would be to 
impose an unrealistic burden on the State and its law-enforcement personnel 
in the execution of their duty."" The paper concurs fully with the Court's 
approach to this issue and acknowledges that the approach is mirrored in 
respect to both military and police lethal force cases. However, with regard 
to the issue of the planning and control of the operation, Strasbourg was keen 
to distinguish the case of McCann from the present case. 
It will be recalled that in the case of McCann, the European Court 
determined that the planning and the control of the operation rendered 
inevitable the use oflethal force, thus not adequately taking into consideration 
the right to life of the three terrorist suspects. 63 The Court in Mc Cann did 
acknowledge that the authorities were not in possession of full facts, as only 
the terrorist suspects would have been fully aware of their plans, thus the 
Government could plan and control the operation on no more than the "basis 
of incomplete hypotheses."64 
In the case of Giuliani, the Italian authorities were dealing with the GS 
Summit, where they were required to ensure the safety of Heads of State, 
various officials, Genoese citizens and thousands of demonstrators. Although 
this was not an archetypal terrorist operation, the Italian authorities were very 
much conscious of the risk of terrorist intervention during the Summit, so the 
Government asserted that "substantial precautions had been taken in case the 
situation degenerated"65 although it was known that violent individuals and 
anarchists had made it to the city of Genoa in readiness for the Summit. With 
this in mind, the Italian Government maintained that it would not have been 
possible to have foreseen exactly what circumstances would transpire, except 
with "the aid of a clairvoyant"66 thus the Italian Government was operating on 
a similar basis to that of McCann and Brady, where operations were planned 
as far as was possible, but where it was acknowledged that circumstances may 
change rapidly as events unfolded. The Court in Giuliani accepted tacitly 
that chance must play some part in the actions of the Stage agents, as "the 
risk of disturbances was unpredictable and depended on how the situation 
developed."'7 This reflects the approach taken by the Court in the case of 
Brady. In this case, the team leader of the operation called the strike earlier 
than planned, meaning that other officers were not yet in position. As a result, 
the victim was still in the process of entering the Club via a window and in the 
confusion, appeared to make a threatening movement, in the belief of PC Bell; 
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PC Bell then shot dead Brady. As it turned out, Brady was carrying a torch, 
and not a gun, as perceived by PC Bell. Brady's accomplices all fled the Club 
on hearing the gunshot and were not prevented from leaving the scene as the 
police back up team had failed to arrive. 68 The Court acknowledged that the 
operation could have been carried out more efficiently and clearly there was 
an element of chance that affected the final outcome of the operation, that of 
the death of James Brady1 but the Court failed to make any link between the 
elements of chance operating that caused PC Bell to shoot Brady. 69 
Yet, this element of chance was starkly ignored in the preceding case of 
McCann. In the instant case, whilst two of the SAS soldiers were closing in on 
two of the suspects, totally coincidentally a police car siren sounded nearby, 
whilst at the same time one of the suspects appeared to register the threat of 
the soldiers. It is likely that the sound of the siren and the realisation of the 
nearby State agents triggered the perceived aggressive and threatening moves 
by the suspects, thus leading the soldiers to open fire. 1he Court stated that 
such actions lacked the degree of caution expected from the use of firearms 
by State agents in a democratic society.70 However what the Court also failed 
to take into consideration, as noted by the dissenters1 is that shooting to 
wound, or attempting to arrest could have been highly dangerous because it 
was thought very likely that one of the suspects was about to detonate a bomb, 
which would have been done by merely pressing a button on a trigger device. 
In such circumstances1 triggering the bomb would have caused devastation 
in the city, thus the soldiers had to ensure that the suspects were incapable 
of pressing the button. In the circumstances therefore1 it does not seem 
unreasonable that when events had taken such a sudden turn for the worse 
that the soldiers should try to ensure the safety of themselves and civilians. 
What is clear however is that this militant approach adopted by the Court 
in McCann was not followed in the later police lethal force cases1 even when 
circumstances were influenced by elements of chance, the atmosphere was 
volatile and there were noted shortcomings in the operations. 
In the most recent case of Giuliani, the applicants identified a number 
of shortcomings in the preparation and conduct of the operation1 including: 
the communications system that did not allow the different agents to be able 
to communicate directly with each otheri the failure to circulate relevant 
information about the demonstration leading State agents to attack an 
authorised march; and the lack of co-ordination between the state agents.71 
The Court acknowledged that the attack on the authorised march was unlawful 
and arbitrary but the Court was mindful of the fact that the unlawful attack 
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did not have a direct bearing on the events that lead to Giuliani's death on 
Piazza Alimonda, as that event took place some hours after the attack on the 
march.72 However, I am uncertain that such a distinction can be made so 
easily. TI1e European Court relied on the opinion of the Genoa District Court, 
stating that the reaction of the demonstrators,"while the aforesaid arbitrary 
actions were occurring", were that of defending themselves, whilst the actions 
of the demonstrators at the event that that led to the death of Giuliani were 
the actions of individuals bent on revenge as a result of the earlier arbitrary 
attack on the march.73 I cannot concur that the chain of causation was broken 
and that the shooting of Giuliani was not as a direct result of the earlier 
unauthorised actions of the Stage agents. 
Notwithstanding the author's submission that the unauthorised attack 
by State agents on demonstrators is directly linked to the revenge attack by 
the demonstrators on the carabiniere, the Court further attempts to distance 
its findings from that of the observations in Mc Cann. I do concur that there 
was no specific target at the GS Summit1 as there was in the Death on the Rock 
case1 or indeed in the case of Ergi, however1 in relation to this point1 the Court 
notes that the "situation was somewhat ill-defined" and agencies were faced 
with "rapidly unfolding and dangerous situations" and as such were "required 
to make crucial operational decisions" and the event that led to Giuliani's 
death could not have been foreseen.74 In light of the evidence, the Court was 
unable to establish that any shortcomings in the planning and conduct of the 
operation led to the death of Giuliani. 
It is disquieting that in the case of McCann, the Court felt justified in 
criticising the actions of Soldier G, one of the SAS soldiers deployed in the 
operation. The Court took time to note that Soldier G carried out a "cursory 
external examination of the car" in which the suspected bomb was located1 
and that his suspicions that a bomb could not be ruled out led to working 
hypotheses on which the actions of the remaining soldiers were based, leading 
to almost unavoidable recourse to lethal force.75 The Court commented that 
there was a failure to make provision for any margin of error.76 However, in 
the case of Giuliani1 Strasbourg discounts any State agent error as being a 
trigger for recourse to lethal force1 even though the carabiniere responsible 
for the victim's death was in a state of panic and stress1 had limited training 
and experience, and was injured.77 The Court was swift to acknowledge that 
the State agents were acting under enormous strain at the end of a long day 
in the face of rapidly developing and dangerous circumstances. The factors 
acknowledged in Giuliani as being unfortunate but ultimately irrelevant with 
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regard to the death were deemed to be of critical importance in the case of 
McCann. I am unconvinced that such factors in the two cases really can be 
distinguished so simplistically. 
My view finds support in the dissenting opinions of Judges Bratza and 
Sikuta in the case of Giuliani. The dissenters note that whilst the exact events 
that occurred in the Piazza Alimonda between the carabiniere and the 
demonstrators could not have been foreseeable, it was entirely foreseeable 
that where there was such a volatile situation then the occupants of the jeep 
would be at risk. Added to that volatile situation was a young1 inexperienced 
carabiniere, who had sustained injury, who was by his own admission, in 
a state of panic and for all intents and purposes, without protection. This 
resulted in the recourse to lethal force, which could only have been as a 
result of shortcomings in the control and direction of the operation. The 
dissenters cannot concur that there was no direct link between the operation 
leading to the stranding of the jeep and its occupants and the death of Carlo 
Giuliani.78 
Such apparent disparities in the Court's methods of scrutiny of police 
and military lethal force cases are not easily rationalised although there may 
be an argument that Strasbourg may be influenced in its decisions due to the 
differences in the perceived roles and operational methodologies of the police 
and the military. For instance, police are considered to be the enforcers of 
legislation, thus acting for and on behalf of the general public and the State, 
whereas the military are perceived to be in the role of defender of the State, 
with greater access to firepower, more autonomy than the police and therefore 
recourse to lethal force may be higher. Indeed1 research suggests that Special 
Forces do operate with greater autonomy than would necessarily be expected 
of police forces.79 If this is so, then perhaps it is not unreasonable for the 
European Court of Human Rights to impose more stringent conditions on 
military lethal force cases to ensure that State agent actions are contained 
with the requirements of the Convention. 80 This however is merely conjecture 
and is certainly not explicitly acknowledged in any manner by Strasbourg. 
Without any judicial rationale, the inconsistency in approach by the Court 
with regard to police and military operations is a double edged sword. On 
the one hand, the disparities give rise to a sense of disquietj there may be 
anomalies in the manner in which the right to life is construed, which may 
undermine the very ethos of the Convention. On the other hand, the apparent 
disparity may ensure that, in some circumstances, the right to life is firmly 
entrenched1 even in the face of the exigencies of the so-called war on terror. 
SS 
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With that in mind, I will return then to the issue with which this paper 
started, that of the shooting dead of Jean Charles de Menezes, the Brazilian 
electrician, on the London Underground by British police. 
The Shooting of Jean Charles de Menezes 
Two weeks after the London city terrorist bombings in 2007 Jean 
Charles de Menezes was on his way to work but unbeknownst to him he 
was the subject of police surveillance as he had been mistaken for Hussain 
Osman, a suspect from the previous day's failed suicide bombing attempt. 
Menezes' movements were tracked by police and at all times he proceeded 
at a calm pace, that was until he arrived at the Underground, and on seeing 
a train entering the station, he broke into a run and boarded the train. This 
theoretically unextraordinary action of running to catch a train tragically 
triggered his death. At the sight of de Menezes breaking into a run, the police 
initiated emergency action, boarding the train, apprehending de Menezes 
and shooting the Brazilian eight times. 81 Later investigations revealed a list 
of tragic errors throughout the execution of the operation that led to his 
mistaken shooting. The errors included: 
Failure to identify de Menezes positively as Hussain Osman; 
Failure to arrest de Menezes prior to entering the Underground 
system, as was instructed by the Commander of the operation; 
Failure to put in place alternative tactical options 
Alteration of evidence after the shooting. 82 
The Crown Prosecution Service decided that no individual police officer 
should face prosecution, although due to the operational errors, the Office of 
Commissioner, as the employer of the Metropolitan Police officers was found 
in breach of the Health and Safety at Work Act 1974, however the jury in that 
case noted that the operational Commander should bear no responsibility. 83 
At the recent inquest into the fatal shooting1 the jury found an open verdict1 
thus no unlawful killing, after direction by the coroner. TI1e Independent 
Police Complaints Commission has also recommended that none of the 
senior officers be disciplined.84 
It must be remembered that the shooting dead of Jean Charles de Menezes 
"occurred in the light of the growing fear of the war on terror"1 85 which reflects 
a new era in the methods of terrorist operations and their subsequent control. 
Such a new era must surely focus the minds of politicians and law enforcement 
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agents alike and responses to perceived threats and possible attacks are led by a 
growing need instil public confidence and thwart the devastating consequences 
of terrorist attacks.86 Nonetheless, it must also be at the forefront of law 
enforcement agents that whilst terrorism requires a robust response from a 
State, it must be balanced with the obligations under Article 2, that of the right 
to life. The question to be asked therefore is: did the actions of the police breach 
the obligations imposed under Article 2 in relation to Jean Charles de Menezes' 
right to life? 'This question has yet to be answered formally as no case has been 
brought to the European Court of Human Rights but one may hypothesise as 
to the possible outcome based on the preceding jurisprudence. 
As has been noted, mistakes that have led to recourse to lethal force have 
been found to be Article 2 compatible by Strasbourg in a number of police lethal 
force operations; the opposite may be said to be true in relation to military 
lethal force operations. The Independent Police Complaints Commission 
(IPCC) noted a catalogue of errors littering the police operation that led up 
to the death of de Menezes, yet the IPPC has made it clear that blame should 
not be apportioned to specific State agents, and the public inquiry found an 
ambiguous open verdict1 so providing no clear answer as to any avenue of 
responsibility. I submit that in the likelihood of de Menezes' family bringing 
a case successfully before Strasbourg, the Court would be bound by cases 
such as Brady, Bubb ins v United Kingdom, 87 Andronicou and Constantinou v 
Cyprus, 88 and the case of Giuliani. 89 If the Court is to follow this line of cases1 
then it is unlikely that the United Kingdom would be found to have breached 
the Brazilian's right to life, regardless of the quality of the planning and 
carrying out of the operation. If this is so, then de Than's poignant remark 
that the European Court's "tendency to find that the police have not failed 
in their Convention duties"90 will remain unchallenged once again. I am not 
of the opinion that this would be a satisfactory outcome, certainly in terms 
of the complying with the obligations under Article 2 of the Convention, 
yet equally I am keenly aware of the huge challenge facing the authorities 
when attempting to balance liberty, security and State accountability. Perhaps 
then it is sadly ironic that if de Menezes had died at the hands of military 
agents carrying out a terrorist operation1 the Court would be likely to .find 
that the United Kingdom would have breached its obligations to respect 
the Brazilian's right to life, thus suggesting that in certain circumstances a 
military response may provide a suitable method of balancing the thorny 
issue of terrorism and the right to life. 
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